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The possibility of eliminating birth defects, genetic diseases, and disabilities 
through gene therapy in utero seems incredible.  Yet the Human Genome Project, a 
federally-funded project that will map and sequence all 50,000 to 100,000 genes in 
each human cell,2 will undoubtedly increase our knowledge of human genetics and 
hopefully lead to the cure of many devastating diseases.  Biotechnological advances 
in gene therapy have already treated thousands of patients.3  By 1994, 2,000 to 3,000 
genetic diseases that will likely respond to gene therapy had been identified.4  
                                                                
1JD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1999; BA: University of California at 
Berkeley, 1992.  The author is currently a law clerk for Judge Andrew L. Sonner of the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals.  The views expressed herein are those of the author only. 
2See Lori B. Andrews, Past as Prologue: Sobering Thoughts on Genetic Enthusiasm, 27 
SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 898 (1997). 
3Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Teen Dies Undergoing Experimental Gene Therapy, 
WASH. POST at A1 (Sept. 29, 1999). 
4See Julia Walsh, Reproductive Rights and The Human Genome Project, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. 
& WOMEN’S STUD. 145, 150 n.26 (1994) (quoting Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. 
Cong., Pub. No. OTA-BP-BA-32, Human Gene Therapy -- Background Paper 1 (1984)).  
“[G]ene therapy is available in conjunction with the [prenatal] diagnosis, as in the case of Rh 
incompatibility. . . .  In some cases, blood transfusions were performed to treat Rh 
incompatibility.”  ROBERT  BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 141 (1995).  Furthermore, the Recombinant DNA 
Advisory Committee recently gave approval for experimental gene therapy of cystic fibrosis 
patients.  Cystic fibrosis is an autosomal recessive genetic disorder which usually manifests 
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Although gene therapy remains in its infancy and gene therapy in utero remains in 
the distant future, legal commentators are already debating issues surrounding the 
obligation of a pregnant woman to her fetus.5 
Most pregnant women will undoubtedly applaud the biotechnological advances 
that will allow prenatal genetic screening technology to properly diagnose and 
correct genetic defects such as sickle cell anemia in utero.  Refusal of gene therapy 
in utero, will likely be rare in pregnancies carried to term once it is established as 
safe and effective.6  In some cases, however, women with strong personal or 
religious beliefs may refuse gene therapy in utero.7  The issues then becomes 
                                                          
itself in the form of chronic lung disease.  Although more traditional forms of treatment have 
extended the medical lifespan of patients to twenty-seven years, the disease remains serious 
and life-shortening.  In addition, cystic fibrosis ‘is the most common lethal genetic disease’ 
among North American white children.  The success of this treatment would affect the lives of 
an estimated eight million carriers in the United States, and will almost certainly change the 
way known carriers think about having children. Walsh, supra, at 150-51. 
The gene responsible for sickle cell anemia, a serious blood disorder, was discovered in 
1949, yet there is still no gene therapy for the syndrome.  See Andrews, supra note 2, at 900.  
The gene that causes thalassemia, a disorder of adult hemoglobin production, has been 
identified as an excellent candidate for gene therapy and experimental trials are likely to begin 
soon.  Walsh, supra, at 149. 
5Compare Lois Shepherd, Protecting Parents’ Freedom to Have Children with Genetic 
Differences, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 761, 803 (1995) (stating, “ordering a pregnant woman to 
undergo fetal surgery to correct a disabling genetic condition . . . would directly interfere with 
her conception of herself as parent to that child. . . .”); with John A. Robertson, Procreative 
Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 444-
46 (1983) (arguing that when fetal therapy is established as safe and effective, then a mother’s 
refusal may make her liable).   
A more likely source of conflict with the fetus’ mother would result from the mother’s 
refusal of a fetal therapy established as safe and effective.  Such a situation arises from 
time to time when a mother refuses an exchange transfusion for a fetus suffering from 
Rh incompatibility. . . .  A mother’s refusal of therapy in these situations could be the 
basis for civil suit or criminal prosecution if it resulted in death or injury to the fetus, 
just as a parent’s refusal of necessary medical care for a child can now be the basis for 
civil or criminal liability.  The fact that the mother must undergo surgery as part of the 
fetal therapy procedure would be no defense if the procedure did not present an undue 
risk to her life or health.  [According to Robertson,] she waived her right to resist 
bodily intrusions made for the sake of the fetus when she chose to continue the 
pregnancy. . . .  A mentally ill pregnant woman whose conduct threatened a viable 
fetus could probably be civilly committed to protect the unborn child.  Perhaps a 
pregnant teenager who became anorectic could be force-fed if she were in the third 
trimester and the danger to the fetus were clearly established.  In utero surgery 
performed through fetoscopy could also be ordered, once its safety and efficacy for the 
fetus is established, because fetoscopy does not carry high risks to the mother. . . .  
[M]andating fetal therapy and prenatal screening illustrate an important limit on a 
woman’s freedom to control her body during pregnancy.  She is free not to conceive, 
and free also to abort after conception and before viability.  But once she chooses to 
carry the child to term, she acquires obligations to assure its well-being. 
Robertson, supra, at 444-46, 450. 
6See Robertson, supra note 5, at 444 n.120. 
7See id. 
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whether a pregnant woman has a legal duty to undergo gene therapy for the sake of 
her fetus and whether a court could order a pregnant woman to undergo gene therapy 
in utero against her will. 
The decision to undergo gene therapy in utero for the sake of a fetus should 
legally rest with the pregnant woman rather than the judiciary or the legislature.8  
Part I of this article provides an overview of the current scope of gene therapy.  Part 
II discusses previous court decisions that either granted or denied petitions for 
involuntary prenatal intervention.  Part III analyzes three reasons why the courts 
should not impose gene therapy on pregnant women as the technology becomes 
available.  First, a policy that mandates gene therapy would place an undue burden 
on pregnant women and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Second, a policy that mandates gene therapy would disparately impact 
women based on race, gender, and socio-economic status.  Finally, public policy 
demands resistance against a policy that mandates gene therapy because of the 
ethical dilemmas inherent in a judicial determination of which “abnormalities” 
should be “fixed.”  Pregnant women should have the right to decide whether or not 
to undergo gene therapy in utero regardless of the seriousness of the disability, the 
effectiveness of the therapy, the intrusiveness of the procedure, or the reasons for 
resisting gene the therapy. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF GENE THERAPY 
Gene therapy involves inserting genetic material into cells to correct specific 
genetic defects in these cells.9  Gene therapy will likely revolutionize modern 
medicine by curing and preventing certain genetic diseases.10  If a prenatal genetic 
                                                                
8Although there may be a moral duty for the pregnant woman to undergo gene therapy, 
this paper addresses only whether there is a legal duty.  I disagree with Deborah Mathieu’s 
statement that, “To assert that no fetal therapy should be mandated, or that all should be, 
would be unreasonable.”  DEBORAH  MATHIEU, PREVENTING  PRENATAL  HARM: SHOULD  THE  
STATE  INTERVENE 54 (1991).  While it is true that “[d]ifferent therapies promise different 
outcomes,” in the case of gene therapy, I believe that even in those few instances in which a 
woman might refuse a non-invasive procedure that is guaranteed to correct a life-threatening 
condition, the woman’s decision should nonetheless be respected.  Id. Mathieu lists six 
conditions that must be met in order to justify state intervention: 1) the harms to be prevented 
to the future person are grave and irreversible; 2) the physical harm of the intervention to the 
mother’s own health is relatively minor; 3) the intervention involves the least intrusive means 
available; 4) the intervention will be successful in preventing or at least ameliorating serious 
prenatal harms; 5) requirements of due process and equal protection of the law are met, and 6) 
the benefits of adopting this type of state intervention as social policy will greatly outweigh 
the benefits. Id. at 128.  Mathieu concludes that “few, if any, coercive state interventions to 
prevent prenatal harms could meet the conditions stated above.”  Id.  However, I argue that 
even if all six conditions Mathieu lists are met, the pregnant woman still has the unilateral 
power to decline gene therapy in utero. 
9See Walsh, supra note 4, at 150 (citations omitted). 
10See Maha F. Munayyer, Genetic Testing and Germ-Line Manipulation: Constructing a 
New Language for International Human Rights, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 687, 691-94 
(1997). 
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test reveals that an embryo may have or be predisposed to a certain genetic defect, 
gene therapy could be utilized to correct that defect in utero.11  
There are two categories of gene therapy: germ-line manipulation and somatic 
cell manipulation.12  Germ-line manipulation targets specific germ cells such as 
sperm or egg cells.13  Somatic cell manipulation targets all other cells in the human 
body.14  Some people are particularly disconcerted with germ-line manipulation 
because any resulting genetic changes are passed on to future generations.15  Some 
people are equally disconcerted by the fact that gene therapy may also change 
physical characteristics such as hair color, eye color, height, and athletic ability.16  
Gene therapy may also alter genetically-linked behavioral features such as 
personality, talent, intelligence, and even sexual orientation.17 
Doctors performed the first authorized gene therapy procedure in 1990 on girls 
ages four and nine who suffered from a grave immune deficiency because they 
lacked the enzyme adenosine deaminase.18  The doctors removed some white blood 
cells, altered them by inserting a gene to produce the missing enzyme, and returned 
the altered cells to the girls’ bodies.19 
                                                                
11See id. 
12See Walsh, supra note 4, at 150; John R. Harding, Jr., Beyond Abortion: Human 
Genetics and The New Eugenics, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 471, 472-73 (1991).  My analysis of 
mandated gene therapy is the same for both types of therapy, and thus, will be collectively 
referred to as gene therapy. 
13See Walsh, supra note 4, at 150; Harding, supra note 12, at 472-73. 
14See Walsh, supra note 4, at 150; Harding, supra note 12, at 472-73. 
15However, the fear that gene therapy may have some impact on the genetic identity of the 
human species must be weighed against the benefit of treating diseases.  See Walsh, supra 
note 4, at 149-50.  J.M. Friedman rejects the fear that gene therapy may have permanent 
effects upon the germ line stating that “[w]hen viewed at the population level, . . . the effect of 
gene therapy of any type on gene frequencies is likely to be much smaller than that caused by 
changes that have already occurred because of environmental alteration and improved health 
care and sanitation.”  J.M. Friedman, Eugenics and the “New Genetics,” 35 PERSP. BIOLOGY 
& MED. 145 (1991).  Also, the Office of Technology Assessment notes that “altering the germ 
line is not unique to gene therapy because several other medical practices — such as 
vaccination, cancer chemotherapy, and radiation therapy — also carry this risk.”  Id. at 150 
n.26 (quoting Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Cong., Pub. No. OTA-BP-BA-32, 
Human Gene Therapy Background Paper 7 (1984)).  However, in other countries, “[b]ecause 
of the permanent nature of GLM [germ-line manipulation] and its potential cosmetic 
application, GLM is illegal in several countries.”  See Munayyer, supra note 9, at 697. 
16See Munayyer, supra note 10, at 691-94. 
17See id. 
18See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 4, at 149; Barbara J. Culliton, Gene Therapy Begins, 
249 SCI. 1372, 1372 (1990).  
19See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 4, at 149.  Both girls are still alive and living normal 
lives nine years later.  Paul Jacobs, Special Millenium Issue/Science & Technology Cutting 
Edge/Frontiers:  Four Fields that Have Been Shaped by and Are Shaping, Southern California, 
Los Angeles Times Magazine 28 (July 25, 1999). 
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By 1997, over 550 Americans underwent gene therapy during approximately 100 
different experiments.20  By late 1999, thousands of patients have been treated with 
various kinds of gene therapy in the United States.21  There is, however, little or no 
evidence of therapeutic benefit to patients who undergo gene therapy.22  A federally-
appointed committee that investigated gene therapy condemned most of the efforts as 
“pure hype.”23  A similarly skeptical evaluation of the effectiveness of gene therapy 
was based on a study in which children with Severe Combined Immune Deficiency 
(SCID) improved after undergoing gene therapy.24  That study did not conclusively 
show that gene therapy caused the improvements by itself because those children 
also received the standard medical treatment for SCID.25 
No one knows exactly when the technology will allow pregnant women to 
undergo gene therapy in utero for the benefit of their fetuses.  As gene therapy is 
likely to become more common,26 legal scholars and bioethicists must not ignore the 
legal and policy implications of gene therapy on pregnant women. 
II.  COURT ORDERED PRENATAL INTERVENTIONS 
Courts generally consider four state interests when they determine whether to 
override competent medical treatment decisions:  preserving life, preventing suicide, 
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession, and protecting third 
parties.27  All four factors weigh in favor of respecting the pregnant woman’s 
decision whether to undergo gene therapy in utero for the sake of her fetus. 
First, the interest to preserve life is arguably irrelevant.  “Although it might be 
argued that the State has an interest in the preservation of the potential life of the 
fetus, courts have traditionally examined the refusal of treatment as it impacts upon 
the preservation of the life of the [decision maker].”28  Second, the interest to prevent 
suicide is inapplicable to gene therapy in utero.  Third, the interest to maintain the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession weighs in favor of the pregnant woman’s 
decision because “the medical profession strongly supports upholding the pregnant 
woman’s autonomy in medical decision-making.”29  Furthermore, the American 
                                                                
20See Andrews, supra note 2, at 901 (citation omitted). 
21Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Teen Dies Undergoing Experimental Gene Therapy, 
WASH. POST at A1 (Sept. 29, 1999). 
22See Andrews, supra note 2, at 901 (citation omitted). 
23See id. 
24See id. at 901. 
25See id. 
26See, e.g., Robin Herman, Gene Therapy is No Longer a Rarity: Applications for 
Experiments are Expected to Quadruple in the Next Two Years, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1992, 
(Health), at 7. 
27See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); In re Baby Boy Doe, 
632 N.E.2d 326, 334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1246 (D.C. 1990). 
28In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 334. 
29Id. at 335 (discussing the American Medical Association’s recommendation that the 
physician’s duty is not to dictate the pregnant woman’s decision, but to ensure that she can 
make an informed decision). 
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Medical Association Board of Trustees recommends against judicial intervention 
when a pregnant woman has made an informed refusal of medical treatment 
designed to benefit her fetus.30  Finally, the interest to protect third parties is not 
always considered by courts.  For example, some courts consider this interest only in 
the context of whether a woman’s refusal of medical treatment will cause her own 
death and orphan her already-born children.31  Other courts, however, do not 
consider this interest to be determinative of a patient’s right to refuse medical 
treatment.32 
In addition to the foregoing state interests, courts may also consider the 
enforceability of a court order.  In In re Baby Boy Doe, the court refused to override 
a pregnant woman’s refusal of a Caesarean section because the State sought a court 
order to compel the surgery but at the same time specifically opposed the use of 
physical force against the pregnant woman.33  The court determined that granting and 
enforcing such a court order would be repugnant.34  In In re A.C., the court noted 
that, “[e]nforcement could be accomplished only through physical force or its 
equivalent.  A.C. would have to be fastened with restraints to the operating table, or 
perhaps involuntarily rendered unconscious by forcibly injecting her with an 
anesthetic, and then subjected to unwanted major surgery.  Such actions would 
surely give one pause in a civilized society, especially when A.C. had done no 
wrong.”35  In In re Fetus Brown, the court considered the enforceability of a court 
order and declined to compel a pregnant woman to undergo a blood transfusion for 
the sake of her fetus.36 
Most courts will not override a pregnant woman’s refusal of medical treatment 
needed solely for the benefit of her fetus.  In Stallman v. Youngquist, the court 
refused to recognize a tort action against a mother for infliction of prenatal injuries 
because such recognition would subject every act of a pregnant woman to state 
scrutiny and thereby intrude upon her rights to privacy, to bodily integrity, and to 
control over her own life.37  The court strongly suggested that no consistent and 
                                                                
30See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 403 (citing H. Cole, Legal Interventions During 
Pregnancy, 264 J.A.M.A. 2603, 2670 (1990)). 
31See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 334 (citing In re Brooks Estate, 205 N.E.2d 435 
(Ill. 1965)); Winthrop University Hospital v. Hess, 128 Misc.2d 804 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1985)); 
Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So.2d 679 (Fla. App. 1987).  See also infra text 
accompanying notes 64-65. 
32See Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990); cf. Norwood Hospital v. Munoz, 
564 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1991) (holding that where there is no evidence of the abandonment of 
minor children, the state’s interest in protecting third parties will not override a competent 
patient’s refusal of medical treatment). 
33See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 335; see also infra text accompanying notes 46-
51. 
34Id. at 335. 
35In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 n.8 (D.C. 1990); see also infra text accompanying notes 
37-45. 
36See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 52-56. 
37See Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss1/6
1999] GENE THERAPY 67 
objective legal standard exists by which to judge a pregnant woman’s actions 
because “[t]he circumstances in which each individual woman brings forth life are as 
varied as the circumstances of each woman’s life.”38  The court reasoned that a fetus 
cannot have rights superior to those of its mother because the law will not treat a 
fetus as an entirely separate entity from its mother.39 
Furthermore, the A.C. court held that a pregnant woman’s decisions regarding 
medical treatment for herself and her fetus should be upheld.40  Substituted 
judgement should only be considered where a patient is incompetent or cannot give 
informed consent.41  In A.C., a terminally ill woman near death was pregnant with a 
viable fetus.42  The lower court ordered the woman to undergo a Caesarean section to 
save her unborn child.43  Doctors performed the surgery yet both the mother and the 
child died.44  The court reviewed the lower court ruling despite its mootness45 and 
held that “in virtually all cases the question of what is to be done is to be decided by 
the patient—the pregnant woman—on behalf of herself and the fetus.”46  The court 
emphasized that competent persons have the right to make informed choices 
regarding medical treatment based on the doctrines of informed consent and bodily 
integrity.47  The court determined that the lower court erred by applying a balancing 
test to weigh the rights of the pregnant woman against the interests of the state.48 
In Baby Boy Doe, the Illinois Court of Appeals refused to compel a pregnant 
woman to undergo a Caesarean section when a problem with the placenta caused her 
fetus to receive insufficient oxygen.49  Similar to the A.C. court, the Baby Boy Doe 
court reasoned that a balancing test should not be used because “a woman’s 
competent choice to refuse medical treatment as invasive as a Caesarean section 
during pregnancy must be honored, even in circumstances where the choice may be 
harmful to her fetus.”50  The court further reasoned that, “a woman is under no duty 
to guarantee the mental and physical health of her child at birth, and thus cannot be 
compelled to do or not do anything merely for the benefit of her unborn child.”51  
                                                                
38See id. at 360. 
39See id. at 359. 
40See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990). 
41See id. at 1237. 
42See id.  
43See id. 
44See id. 
45See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1242 (stating that the case was one which is “capable of 
repetition, yet evading review”). 
46See id. At 1237. 
47See id. at 1243. 
48See id. at 1247. 
49See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
50Id. at 326. 
51Id. at 332. 
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The court emphasized that it knows of “no case that suggests that a mother or any 
other competent person has an obligation or responsibility to provide medically for a 
fetus . . . .”52  The woman eventually delivered a healthy baby boy despite the 
physician’s prediction that her fetus had virtually no chance to survive natural 
childbirth.53   
The Baby Boy Doe court left open the question whether a court could compel a 
pregnant woman to undergo a blood transfusion by characterizing it as non-invasive 
and relatively risk-free compared to a Caesarean section.54  Three years later, 
however, the Fetus Brown court addressed the issue whether a court could compel a 
blood transfusion.55  The court refused to compel a pregnant woman to undergo a 
blood transfusion for the benefit of her fetus.56  Doctors estimated that the woman 
and her fetus had a five-percent chance of survival if she refused to undergo the 
transfusion.57  The court rejected the characterization of blood transfusions as 
“relatively non-invasive and risk-free procedures” and determined that they are 
invasive procedures that interrupt a competent adult’s bodily integrity.58  The court 
stated that, “without a determination by the Illinois legislature that a fetus is a 
minor . . . we cannot impose a legal obligation upon a pregnant woman to consent to 
an invasive medical procedure for the benefit of her viable fetus.”59 
Conversely, some courts subject pregnant women to medical procedures against 
their will.  In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, the court 
ordered a Caesarean section over religious objections of a pregnant woman.60  
Doctors estimated that there was a ninety-nine percent chance that the child would 
not survive natural childbirth and that there was a fifty percent chance that the 
mother would not survive natural childbirth.61  Doctor’s further estimated that a 
Caesarean section would likely provide nearly a one-hundred percent chance to save 
the lives of both the child and the mother.62  Contrary to the A.C. and Baby Boy Doe 
                                                                
52Id. at 329.  “‘Even though we may consider appellant’s beliefs unwise, foolish or 
ridiculous, in the absence of an overriding danger to society we may not permit interference 
therewith . . . for the sole purpose of compelling her to accept medical treatment forbidden by 
her religious principles and previously refused by her with full knowledge of the probable 
consequences.’”  Id. at 331 (citing In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1965)). 
53Id. at 328, 329 (stating the baby was “somewhat underweight” at birth).  The fact that the 
physician’s prediction was wrong is another reason courts should decline granting petitions for 
involuntary prenatal interventions. 
54In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 333. 
55See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
56Id. 
57Id. at 398. 
58Id. at 405. 
59Id. at 405-06. 
60Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981). 
61Id. at 86. 
62Id. 
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explicit rejections of balancing tests,63 the Jefferson court balanced the rights of the 
mother to practice her religion and to refuse the surgery against the right to life of the 
fetus and the state interest to preserve the life of the mother.64  The court determined 
that medical treatment can be compelled against a competent adult in narrow 
circumstances where a balancing test is properly used.65  Jefferson can be 
distinguished from A.C. and Baby Boy Doe because the Caesarean section benefited 
both mother and fetus rather than the fetus alone and thereby triggered the court to 
use a balancing test.66 
Similarly, in In re Jamaica Hospital, the court ordered a blood transfusion over 
the religious objections of a pregnant Jehovah’s Witness.67  The court determined 
that the state interest to protect third parties must be considered because the woman 
was a single mother of ten children whose only next of kin was a sister that was 
unable to care for children.68  The Jamaica Hospital decision is distinguishable from 
court decisions to refuse to order medical treatment for pregnant women because it 
considered the welfare of already-born children rather than only the fetus. 
Other court decisions that order medical treatment against the will of pregnant 
women are not so easily distinguishable.  In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial 
Hospital v. Anderson, a pregnant Jehovah’s Witness refused to undergo a blood 
transfusion for religious reasons.69  The court held that a pregnant woman in her final 
weeks of pregnancy does not have the right to refuse necessary life saving treatment 
when the life of the fetus is also at stake.70  In Crouse Irving Memorial Hospital, Inc. 
v. Paddock, the court ordered blood transfusions despite a pregnant woman’s 
refusal.71  The woman agreed to undergo a Caesarean section but refused any blood 
transfusions based on her deep religious beliefs.72  The court emphasized that parents 
have the right to deny their children medical treatment unless they need lifesaving 
treatment.73  The court ordered the blood transfusions to protect the health of the 
fetus and the mother.74  Similarly, in In re Madyun, a pregnant Muslim woman 
whose water had broken for more than forty-eight hours refused a Caesarean section 
                                                                
63See supra text accompanying notes 42-48. 
64Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 460. 
65Id. 
66Id. at 86; see also supra text accompanying notes 40-53 (rejecting use of balancing test 
when an invasive procedure would benefit the fetus alone because a fetus cannot have rights 
superior to those of its mother). 
67See In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
68Id. 
69See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964). 
70Id. 
71Crouse Irving Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
72Id. at 444. 
73Id. at 444-45; cf. Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990). 
74Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 445. 
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based on her strong religious beliefs.75  The court balanced the significant risks to the 
fetus against the minimal risks to the mother and concluded that there was a 
compelling interest for court-ordered medical intervention.76 
The Anderson, Paddock, and Madyun decisions involved life-threatening 
situations.77  These decisions also involved fetuses that were gestationally well-
advanced and approached “a moral status that is close to, but slightly less strong 
than, normative personhood.”78  Gene therapy would likely almost never involve a 
life-threatening situation.  Gene therapy instead would likely involve attempts to 
prevent disabilities.  Moreover, gene therapy in utero would most likely occur early 
in a pregnancy to introduce normal genes into the chromosomes of the cells of 
defective genes.79  Therefore, the Roe v. Wade trimester approach to abortion based 
on the “viability” of the fetus80 will not likely be implicated by gene therapy in utero.  
Gene therapy would likely occur before the fetus becomes viable.  A woman should 
not be forced to undergo gene therapy in utero when she has the legal right to abort 
the fetus.  If gene therapy does occur after viability, however, the Anderson, 
Paddock, and Madyun courts would only order gene therapy in utero during life-
threatening situations. 
Courts should respect the decision of a pregnant woman regardless of the 
viability of her fetus in future cases that involve gene therapy in utero.  A pregnant 
woman who refuses gene therapy in utero that would only benefit her fetus is 
distinguishable from parents who refuse medical treatment for their already-born 
children.  Illinois courts consistently hold that the state can intervene under life-
threatening circumstances and provide medical procedures over parental objections 
once a child is born; however, the state cannot override a competent patient’s 
decision for the benefit of a fetus alone.81  Perhaps gene therapy should follow this 
distinction.  Doctors should not conduct gene therapy in utero without consent.  The 
performance of gene therapy in utero over the objections of a pregnant woman would 
arguably violate her rights to equal protection, privacy, bodily integrity, religious 
freedom, and due process.  After birth, courts should order risk-free procedures that 
prove effective to cure life-threatening diseases over parental objections.  At the 
same time, courts should never order in utero procedures on pregnant women over 
their competent refusal. 
                                                                
75See In re Madyun, 573 A.2d 1235 (1990) (appendix to In re A.C.). 
76Id. at 1264. 
77See supra text accompanying notes 69-76. 
78CARSON STRONG, ETHICS IN REPRODUCTIVE AND PERINATAL MEDICINE 179 (1997). 
79See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 4, at 149 (describing the science of gene therapy). 
80Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
81Compare Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1952) (ordering a blood transfusion 
for an eight day old infant over the parents’ religious objections) with In re Fetus Brown, 689 
N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (declining to order a pregnant woman to undergo a blood 
transfusion and stating that the legislature must declare that a fetus is a minor before a 
pregnant woman’s consent could be overridden) and In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1994) (declining to order a pregnant woman to undergo a Caesarean section). 
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III.  REASONS NOT TO MANDATE GENE THERAPY IN UTERO 
A.  An Unconstitutional Burden on Women 
The coercion of pregnant women to undergo gene therapy in utero would place 
an undue burden on women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.82  Before the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act,83 courts held that pregnancy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause as an 
illegal sex-based classification.84  In Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, the 
court stated: 
Only women become pregnant; only women become mothers.  But Mrs. 
Cohen’s leap from those physical facts to the conclusion that any 
regulation of pregnancy and maternity is an invidious classification by sex 
is merely simplistic . . . .  Pregnancy and motherhood do have a great 
impact on the lives of women, and, if that impact be reasonably noticed by 
a governmental regulation, it is not to be condemned as an invidious 
classification.85 
In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Geduldig v. Aiello that a state disability 
insurance system that failed to include pregnancy within its coverage did not 
unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of sex.86  The Court stated: 
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow 
that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is sex based 
classification . . . .  Absent a showing that distinctions involving 
pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination 
against members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally 
free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such 
                                                                
82U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”). 
83See infra text accompanying notes 88-91. 
84See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 
(1974); Cohen v. Chesterfield Co. Sch. Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 397 (4th Cir. 1973). 
85Cohen v. Chesterfield Co. Sch. Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 397 (4th Cir. 1973).  In Cohen, the 
court gave examples of legal government regulations that do not apply equally to men and 
women, such as regulations requiring all personnel to be clean shaven and laws that prohibit 
adult women from sunbathing topless.  Id. at 397.  The dissenting judge would have found the 
Cohen regulation unconstitutional and stated: 
The majority concludes that the regulation does not discriminate against women as 
such; it only discriminates between pregnant teachers and other teachers.  The 
distinguishing factor seems to be motherhood versus fatherhood.  The simple question 
then arises: Is this sex related?  To the simple query the answer is just as simple: 
Nobody . . . has yet seen a male mother.  A mother, to oversimplify the simplest 
biology, must then be a woman.” 
Id. at 400-01 (Winter, J., dissenting).  
86See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
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as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical 
condition.87 
Congress responded to the Court’s decisions in Geduldig and General Electric 
Co. v. Gilbert88 by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (the “PDA”), as an 
amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.89  The PDA declared that 
discrimination based on pregnancy is facially discriminatory.90  In Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, the Court interpreted the PDA and held that 
“discrimination based on a woman’s pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination 
because of her sex.”91 
Subsequently, in International Union v. Johnson Controls, the Court held that a 
company policy that prohibited women of childbearing age from performing 
occupations that might expose them to lead and cause birth defects violated both the 
PDA and the Fourteenth Amendment.92  The Court reasoned that male reproductive 
capacities were also vulnerable to lead exposure but the policy prohibited only 
women from performing such occupations.93  The Court concluded that the policy 
explicitly discriminated against women on the basis of sex.94  The Court relied on the 
PDA determination that Title VII discrimination on the basis of sex included 
discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions.”95  The Court held the policy to be facially discriminatory 
“because it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of the company’s male 
employees in the same way as it applied to that of the females.”96   
                                                                
87Id. at 496 n.20. 
88General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).  In Gilbert, the company’s policy of 
compensating for all disabilities except pregnancy was not shown to favor men over women.  
Id.  “Pregnancy is, of course, confined to women, but it is in other ways significantly different 
from the typical covered disease or disability.”  Id. at 136. 
89Title VII states an employer may not “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because 
of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 2003-2(a)(2) (1998). 
90See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. 
91Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).  
There was no challenge to the constitutionality of the PDA. 
92International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
93Id. at 196-98 (“Fertile men, but not fertile women, are given a choice as to whether they 
wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular job. . . .  Johnson Controls’ policy is 
facially discriminatory because it requires only a female employee to produce proof that she is 
not capable of reproducing.”). 
94Id. at 197. 
95Id. at 198-99. 
96Id. at 199. 
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Despite the PDA, not every pregnancy-related discrimination complaint 
successfully proves illegal sex discrimination.97  In Dimino v. Staten Island Railway, 
a police officer alleged that her employer prevented her from performing her job 
solely because of her pregnancy.98  The officer requested to be placed on restricted 
duty but she was instead told to go home.99  The court determined that Johnson 
Controls was distinguishable because there was no determinant policy that prevented 
pregnant police officers from performing certain jobs.100  Rather, the officer 
requested to be placed on restricted duty.101  The court held that absent a determinant 
policy, there could be no illegal pregnancy-based classification.102 
Under the PDA, a gene therapy policy that applies to the reproductive capacity of 
men in the same way that it does to women would likely be upheld under Title VII 
and the Equal Protection Clause.  Genetic alteration of male sperm whose male 
genetics hold the disability or disease could actually preempt the issues that arise 
from gene therapy in utero.  Some suggest that gene therapy can be performed on 
males through the use of mice.103  Male sperm could be genetically altered and 
produced inside mouse testes before being used to fertilize the female egg.104  The 
issues surrounding compelled gene therapy in utero, however, only implicate 
women.  The policy would therefore “apply to the reproductive capacity of . . . 
                                                                
97See Dimino v. Staten Island Railway, No. CIV A. CV-97-5927DGT, 1998 WL 760341 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1998); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 330-31 
(1993) (upholding the right of anti-abortion activists to hold demonstrations at abortion clinics 
and holding that opposition to abortion does not discriminate against a class of women seeking 
abortion).  Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bray argued that all pregnancy based classifications 
illegally discriminate based on sex and states, “[I]t seems commonsense, that since only 
women can become pregnant, discrimination against pregnant people is necessarily 
discrimination against women. . . .”  Bray, 506 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 
Rep. Hawkins’ statements in 123 Cong.Rec. 10581 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hawkins). 
98See Dimino, 1998 WL 760341 at *1. 
99Id. 
100Id. at *4. 
101Id. 
102Id. at *5. 
103See Rick Weiss, Science on the Ethical Frontier: Engineering the Unborn, THE  WASH. 
POST, March 22, 1998, at A1. 
One way germline therapy may be done to ensure a man with a genetic disease doesn’t 
pass it to his child: 
1. Doctors remove the man’s sperm-producing cells, which contain a defective gene. 
2. A healthy gene is added to each cell to replace the defective ones. 
3. The cells are put into mouse testes. 
4. They mature inside the mouse and start producing healthy human sperm. 
5. Those sperm, once tested, are used to fertilize a woman’s eggs in a laboratory dish. 
6. The resulting embryos are placed in a woman’s womb. 
7. She gives birth to a child whose genes are free from the father’s disease. 
Id. 
104Id. 
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male[s] in [a different] way as it applies to that of the females.”105  Based on Johnson 
Controls and Dimino, any policy that compels women to undergo gene therapy in 
utero would likely be a sex-based classification. 
In Craig v. Boren, the Court set forth a legal standard to evaluate the 
constitutionality of gender classifications.106  The Court used an intermediate level of 
scrutiny to determine that gender-based classifications “must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives.”107  The Court would likely uphold a sex-based classification 
regarding gene therapy in utero based on the legitimate governmental interest in 
public health.108  Furthermore, gene therapy procedures performed in utero that 
successfully prevent birth defects and diseases are likely “substantially related” to 
such a governmental objective because those procedures directly cause the 
“successful” outcome.  This is not, however, the end of the inquiry.  Courts will also 
likely consider whether a policy has discriminatory effect109 or whether it places an 
undue burden on specific individuals.110 
For example, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, the Court examined 
whether a school board policy that required pregnant teachers to take maternity leave 
five months before their due dates was sufficient means to achieve the legitimate 
objective of continuity of instruction.111  The Court determined that the school board 
policy served important governmental objectives and was substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives under Craig but examined “whether the particular 
means chosen to achieve those objectives unduly infringe[d] upon the [pregnant] 
teacher’s constitutional liberty.”112  The Court “has long recognized that freedom of 
personal choice in matters of marriage and family is one of the liberties protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”113 
                                                                
105See Dimino, 1998 WL 760341 at *5 (quoting International Union v. Johnson Controls, 
Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199, 211 (1991)). 
106See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding a statute prohibiting males under age 
21 and females under age 18 from buying beer to be unconstitutional sex discrimination). 
107Id. at 197.  Chief Justice Burger’s dissenting opinion states that the majority’s 
intermediate level scrutiny standard “apparently comes out of thin air.”  Id. at 220 (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting).  The Chief Justice would have applied the rational basis test which would 
have upheld the statute as being rationally related to the governmental objective and “permits 
the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens 
differently than others.”  Id. at 216-17, 221-22. 
108Id. at 199-200. 
109See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 154 (1977) (“Even though a plan which 
frankly and unambiguously discriminates against pregnancy is ‘facially neutral,’ the Court will 
find it unlawful if it has a ‘discriminatory effect.’”) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also supra 
Part III B describing the likely discriminatory effect of gene therapy in utero. 
110See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
111Id. at 641-42. 
112Id. at 647. 
113Id. at 639 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and other cases).  If the Supreme Court 
can constitutionally guarantee a right to abortion, forcing a pregnant woman to undergo gene 
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Similarly, in Nashville Gas Company v. Satty, the Court based its decision on the 
imposition of a substantial burden.114  The Court stated that “petitioner has not 
merely refused to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive, but 
has imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer.”115  Under 
Satty, the substantial burden test might preclude courts from forcing pregnant women 
to undergo gene therapy in utero. 
Court compulsion of gene therapy in utero forces a medical procedure upon 
women that no man would ever have to bear.116  Those courts would place an undue 
burden on pregnant women by forcing them to undergo gene therapy in utero while 
at the same time refusing to force others to donate bone marrow or blood to their 
living relatives.117   
Many courts uniformly decline to force medical procedures upon individuals, 
particularly minor children.  In Curran v. Bosze, the court declined to order three-
year-old twins to undergo blood tests to determine bone marrow compatibility with 
their leukemia-stricken half-brother.118  The mother of the twins resisted the father’s 
compulsion and refused to consent to the procedure.119  The court determined that 
previous cases of court-ordered medical procedures involved benefits to the potential 
donors based on their close relationships with the recipients and the consent of both 
parents of the donors.120  Based on Curran, mandated gene therapy in utero would 
                                                          
therapy to prevent a child with a disability or disease should also remain a woman’s choice.  
However, even though the right to an abortion disappears at the point of a fetus’ viability, I 
argue gene therapy, even for viable fetuses, should not be performed over a pregnant woman’s 
objections. 
114See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1977). 
115Id. at 142.  On the other hand, Justice Stevens stated, “Differences between benefits and 
burdens cannot provide a meaningful test of discrimination since, by hypothesis, the favored 
class is always benefited and the disfavored class is equally burdened.”  Id. at 155 n.4 
(Stevens, J., concurring).  In my analysis, however, imposing a burden on pregnant women 
does not benefit men or any “favored class.”  I believe the discrimination is that there is no 
burden placed on men while there would be a heavy burden imposed on pregnant women. 
116See Walsh, supra note 4, at 164. 
117See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990) (refusing to compel twin minors to 
donate bone marrow to a half sibling despite the little risk to the twins and the sibling’s life 
depended on the transplant; in fact, the court would not even compel the minors to undergo a 
blood test to determine whether they would be compatible donors); McFall v. Shimp, 10 
Pa.D.3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978) (refusing to order Shimp to donate bone marrow to 
save cousin’s life); Lausier v. Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975) (holding that an 
incompetent brother cannot be forced to donate a kidney to save the life of his dying sister); 
Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (U.S. App. D.C. 1941) (requiring parental consent, 
despite the fifteen year old’s own consent, for removal of a skin patch to benefit severely 
burned cousin). 
118See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990). 
119Id. 
120Id. at 1331.  For example, in Strunk v. Strunk, the Kentucky Court of Appeals granted a 
petition for a kidney to be removed from a mentally incompetent ward of the State to be 
implanted in the ward’s brother because of the close relationship between the brothers.  See 
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Ky. 1969).  The ward was “greatly dependent upon 
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not pass muster without the consent of the pregnant woman to the procedure.  A 
pregnant woman certainly has a close relationship to the recipient, i.e., the fetus.  
However, a policy that forces a competent pregnant woman to undergo medical 
treatment against her will provides no emotional, psychological, or medical benefit 
to that woman. 
[O]ne human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take 
action to save another human being or to rescue . . . .  For our law to 
compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change 
every concept and principle upon which our society is founded.  To do so 
would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule 
which would know no limits, and one could not imagine where the line 
would be drawn.121 
A policy that mandates gene therapy in utero for the benefit of the fetus would 
likely place an unconstitutional undue burden on pregnant women.  Donating blood 
takes only about an hour, causes only slight discomfort, has no permanent side 
effects, and is desperately necessary.122  Yet, courts refuse to compel blood donations 
despite their simplicity and despite any arguments based on morality.123  “Most 
people do not want to live in a society in which they can be compelled to undergo 
surgery or sacrifice body parts, even if it would be morally incumbent upon them to 
do so.  Placing limits on what can be demanded of citizens, especially where bodily 
integrity is involved, is essential to a free society.”124  “Surely . . . a fetus cannot have 
rights . . . superior to those of a person who has already been born.”125 
                                                          
[his brother], emotionally and psychologically, and [the ward’s] well-being would be 
jeopardized more severely by the loss of his brother than by the removal of a kidney.”  Id.  
Similarly, in Hart v. Brown, parents of identical seven year old twins sought to have a kidney 
removed from the healthy twin to be transplanted into the seriously ill twin.  See Hart v. 
Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Supp. 1972).  The hospital sought a court declaration that the 
parents had the right to give their consent to the operation.  Id. at 387.  The court allowed the 
kidney transplant based on the “immense benefit to the donor in that the donor would be better 
off in a family that was happy than in a family that was distressed and in that it would be a 
very great loss to the donor if the donee were to die from her illness.”  Id. at 389-90.  
Addditionally, in Little v. Little, the court granted a mother’s petition to remove the kidney of 
her mentally incompetent daughter to be transplanted in her younger son based on the close 
relationship between the donor and donee and both parents’ consent.  See Hart v. Brown, 289 
A.2d 386 (Conn. Supp. 1972). 
121See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa.D.3d 90, 91 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978). 
122See Bonnie Steinbock, Maternal-Fetal Conflict and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 57 ALB. L. 
REV. 781, 790 (1994). 
123Id. at 791. 
124Id. at 790. 
125In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. 1990). 
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B.  The Discriminatory Impact and Treatment of Involuntary Gene Therapy on 
Pregnant Women: Race, Gender, and Socio-economic Status 
1.  Race 
If courts order a pregnant women to undergo gene therapy, racial minorities may 
be treated discriminatorily.  Historically, eugenics programs targeted both women,126 
and minorities.  In 1912, the Public Health Service gave immigrants intelligence tests 
because the Service suspected that immigrants were a prime source of social 
decline.127  “The inadequate genes of the people trying to gain entry to the United 
States was ‘demonstrated’ by H.H. Goddard . . . who administered pen and paper 
intelligence tests to exhausted, frightened individuals who had just landed on Ellis 
Island.  The results — 87% of the Russians, 83% of the Jews, 80% of the 
Hungarians, and 79% of the Italians were found to be feebleminded.”128  In 1924, 
Congress set quotas on the number of immigrants from various countries in response 
to such “social decline.”129  By 1931, most states passed eugenic laws that authorized 
the involuntary sterilization of certain groups of people.130 
Furthermore, poor women of color are more likely to be deemed “unfit” and 
subjected to sterilization abuse.131  The sterilization rates of poor women and women 
of color are higher than those of white women.132  An estimated 30% to 42% of all 
Native Americans have been sterilized and Hispanic women who neither spoke nor 
understood English were often subjected to sterilization in Los Angeles.133 
Some commentators predict that similar discrimination against ethnic minorities 
will occur as gene therapy procedures continue to develop: 
In the future, people thought to have genetic predisposition to crime might 
be subject to gene therapy if it becomes usable . . . .  Any medical 
intervention to curtail the manifestation of alleged criminal genes would 
be applied in a discriminatory fashion.  African-American individuals are 
more likely to be prosecuted than white individuals and African-American 
individuals receive harsher sentences than Whites for similar crimes.134  
                                                                
126See infra text accompanying notes 138-152. 
127See Harding, supra note 12, at 481. 
128Andrews, supra note 2, at 908 (citations omitted). 
129Id. 
130See Harding, supra note 12, at 481 (stating that thirty two states had passed 
discriminatory eugenic laws). 
131See Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the 
Ideology of Motherhood, The Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist 
Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1231 (1992). 
132Id. at 1232 (listing ethnic elitism, classism, and racism as reasons for the increased 
sterilization rates among women of color and poor women). 
133Id. 
134Andrews, supra note 2, at 913-14. 
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Lori Andrews states that out of twenty-one cases where court orders were sought 
for prenatal interventions, 81% of the women were black.135  Court-ordered 
Caesarean sections are disproportionately imposed on low-income women of 
color.136  Furthermore, the majority of all court-ordered surgeries were performed on 
women of color, many of whom were immigrants and refugees.137 
Unfortunately, there is no compelling reason to believe that a court system that 
discriminatorily applies criminal sentences would equally order gene therapy 
procedures.  On the other hand, courts could mandate gene therapy only on those 
individuals thought to be “valuable” or “worthy” in our society.  The expense that 
will likely accompany gene therapy procedures may actually prohibit many 
minorities from receiving gene therapy treatment in utero.  Regardless, courts should 
neither mandate nor prohibit gene therapy in utero. 
2.  Gender 
Gender, like race, will also likely play a large role in a court’s decision to order 
gene therapy.  Historically, eugenics efforts disproportionately targeted women.138  
The first American eugenics efforts — the institutionalization of the ‘feebleminded’ 
— concentrated largely on women.139  Some argue that geneticists and policy makers 
saw promiscuous women as a social problem and developed institutionalization and 
sterilization programs that forced women to behave in socially acceptable ways and 
forbade them from creating children outside of marriage.140  For example, Carrie 
Buck, the woman who was involuntarily sterilized and about whom Justice Holmes 
stated that, “three generations of imbeciles is enough,”141 was not an imbecile.142  Ms. 
Buck and her daughter both did well in school.143  Ms. Buck was institutionalized 
because she was ‘immoral’ for having a child out of wedlock rather than because she 
was ‘feebleminded.’144 
The targeting of socially undesirable women continues today as “97% of 
obstetricians favor sterilizing unmarried welfare mothers.”145  Although legislation 
                                                                
135See LORI B. ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS: A LEGAL FRONTIER 236 (1987). 
136See Deborah J. Krauss, Regulating Women’s Bodies: The Adverse Effect of Fetal Rights 
Theory on Childbirth Decisions and Women of Color, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 523 (1991). 
137See Nancy K. Kubasek, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE  L.J. 492, 517 (1993). 
138See Andrews, supra note 2, at 906-07.  “In the late 1800s, . . . [t]raits such as 
feeblemindedness, criminality, pauperism, [and] prostitution . . . were thought to be single 
gene defects.”  Id. at 893-94. 
139Id. at 906. 
140Id. (citing Nicole H. Rafter, Claims-Making and Socio-Cultural Context in the First 
U.S. Eugenics Campaign, 39 SOC. PROBS. 17-34 (Feb. 1993)). 
141See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
142See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 52 (1985). 
143Id. 
144Id. 
145Andrews, supra note 2, at 909. 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss1/6
1999] GENE THERAPY 79 
that requires involuntary sterilization of welfare women has not been passed, several 
states have proposed legislation that provides financial incentives for welfare women 
who implant contraceptives or undergo sterilization.146  Rosemarie Tong fears that 
pregnant women who decline gene therapy will be punished and wrote the following 
of individuals who are quick to punish women who do not have the perfect baby: 
Currently, a relatively high number of citizens seem prepared to punish 
women for ‘negligently, recklessly, or intentionally’ engaging in lifestyle 
behaviors that result in serious, irreparable damage to their infants.  Such 
behaviors are believed to encompass everything from engaging in unsafe 
sex with HIV-positive partners to not eating enough nutritious food, 
working in toxic environments, drinking too much caffeine, 
overexercising or underexercising, taking licit as well as illicit drugs that 
might imperil fetal well-being, or failing to follow physicians’ orders.  
Already, many pregnant women have been prosecuted and, in a few 
instances, imprisoned for giving birth to cocaine-exposed infants.  What 
some feminists fear, then, is that if the concept of ‘fetal abuse’ or ‘fetal 
negligence’ captures the public’s imagination, the public might decide to 
punish not only pregnant women who do not ‘take care of themselves’ but 
also pregnant women who do not submit to gene therapy for their 
fetuses.147 
Furthermore, women will likely fall further from social equality if gene therapy is 
used for cosmetic purposes such as thinness or athletic ability.  “Given that all too 
many people will want their children to fit prevailing social norms, even when these 
norms happen to be sexist, racist, and classist in nature, gene therapy for 
enhancement purposes will only make the struggle for equity between men and 
women that much more difficult.”148  The use of gene therapy for cosmetic purposes 
could actually lead to an increase in genetic diseases as unexpected side effects 
result from the alteration of the gene pool.149  For example, blond hair and blue eyes 
have been linked to an increased susceptibility to skin cancer.150  A narrow gene pool 
could also decrease the chances of human survival in the event of an epidemic.  For 
example, while the United States may attempt to obliterate sickle cell anemia and 
cystic fibrosis, a recessive gene for sickle cell anemia or cystic fibrosis may be 
necessary to survive in other parts of the world.151  The recessive sickle cell anemia 
gene protects against malaria and the recessive cystic fibrosis gene protects against 
cholera.152 
                                                                
146Id. 
147ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS:  THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS 
AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 239 (1997). 
148Id. at 241. 
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3.  Socio-Economic Status 
Since the 1800’s, the policy argument in favor of sterilizing criminals and the 
feebleminded was that those individuals cost money to the rest of society.153  In 
1907, Indiana enacted the first eugenics law that “provided for the involuntary 
sterilization of institutionalized, unimprovable individuals who were idiots, 
imbeciles, rapists, or habitual criminals.”154  Society could similarly support court-
ordered gene therapy in utero because of the societal financial costs associated with 
the care of disabled children.155  Furthermore, health care providers may coerce 
women to undergo gene therapy out of fear of liability for a child born with a genetic 
disorder.  There are documented accounts of physicians who pressure pregnant 
women to abort genetically abnormal fetuses out of fear of liability.156 
Any policy that mandates gene therapy in utero must realistically consider the 
costs involved.  Economically disadvantaged women cannot afford the extreme 
expense that may be associated with gene therapy procedures.157  Similar to poor 
women who must forego basic necessities and delay abortions until they can afford 
them,158 mandated gene therapy in utero will likely deplete a pregnant woman of 
valuable financial resources that could be used to care for her upcoming baby.  
“[G]iven the absence of any national health insurance that would guarantee access of 
all pregnant women to [gene therapy,] it would be illogical and most unfair to hold a 
pregnant woman liable for failing to utilize a medical procedure that she was unable 
to afford.”159  “[F]eminists who favor gene therapy aimed at treating diseases and 
defects urge that it be provided to all women, rich or poor, on the grounds that all 
women should have equal procreative freedom.”160  
The combination of race, gender, and socio-economic status play a large role in 
the societal definitions of who is “socially undesirable.”  For example, obstetricians 
almost unanimously agree that women on welfare should not continue to have 
                                                                
153See Andrews, supra note 2, at 894. 
154Id. at 895 (stating further that the Nazis modeled their sterilization law after the 
American model). 
155See Walsh, supra note 4, at 176 (“[S]ociety may reject children who are born with 
disabilities and the women who chose to have them.  These attitudes may be driven by pure 
economics, since the public may fear the additional costs of caring for disabled children. . . .”). 
156See Andrews, supra note 2, at 981. 
157See TONG, supra note 147, at 240. 
158See Women of the State of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 26 (Minn. 1995) (stating 
both parties conceded that Medicaid-eligible women who are denied funding delay abortion 
while seeking alternative funds and that women commonly cancel and reschedule 
appointments a number of times while seeking alternative funds); Laura M. Friedman, Family 
Cap and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Scrutinizing a Welfare Woman’s Right to 
Bear Children, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 660 (1995). 
159TONG, supra note 147, at 141. 
160Id.  Although I agree that all women should have equal procreative freedom, I disagree 
with Rosemarie Tong’s statement that women should be provided gene therapy.  I would 
change Tong’s statement from “provided to all women” to “available to all women.” 
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss1/6
1999] GENE THERAPY 81 
children.161  If society, the courts, or the legislature decide to force sterilization, 
contraception, or gene therapy on individuals deemed socially undesirable, a clear 
line cannot be drawn between those who are and are not worthy of bearing children.  
Involuntary sterilization or mandated gene therapy of certain groups of people may 
cross the line between preventing disease and serving clearly eugenic goals.162  If all 
jailed criminals were sterilized, it would certainly be naive for anyone to think that 
all crime would suddenly cease.  Similarly, if pregnant women are forced to alter the 
genes of their fetuses, it would be naïve to think that all genetic “abnormalities” or 
“defects” would suddenly be eliminated. 
C.  Public Policy: The Impossible Ethical Dilemmas Involved in Determining Which 
“Abnormalities” Should be “Fixed” 
Everyone has their own notion of what constitutes a “meaningful” life.  Everyone 
most likely accepts that people should be free from pain at all times, should have 
love and happiness in their lives, and should be able to function as independent 
human beings.  Quality of life issues arise when individuals pity or feel sorry for 
others, or when individuals judge the decisions of others, especially parents.  It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to detach our own notions of a meaningful life.  In In re 
Sampson, the court overrode a mother’s decision to not force her fifteen-year-old son 
to undergo several operations to correct a facial condition called 
neurofibromatosis.163  Despite a lack of evidence that the teenager felt “abnormal” or 
unhappy, the judge stated that, “whatever chance he may have for a normal, happy 
existence . . . will unquestionably be impossible if the disfigurement is not 
corrected.”164 
“The difficulty deciding which abnormalities should be fixed [i.e. by gene 
therapy] stems from our notions of quality of life.  Using our own conceptions of 
what we think would not be worth living are imposed on whether we think other 
individuals would want to live.”165  These “subjective assessments about the quality 
of life of the child to be born”166 illustrate that it may be impossible to decide which 
illnesses, or disabilities, gene therapy should “fix.” 
Some individuals would likely support the abortion of a fetus with a serious 
genetic defect or the correction of such a defect using gene therapy to prevent 
“suffering.”  The concept of “suffering”, however, is just as subjective as individual 
views on “quality of life.”  In fact, “health” and “disease” concepts and definitions 
                                                                
161See supra text accompanying note 145. 
162
“Eugenics is generally defined as the ‘improvement of the human species by selective 
breeding.”  See Friedman, supra note 14, at 145.  “Eugenics has been described as a social 
movement to improve the human species through the use of technology.”  See Harding, supra 
note 12, at 477. 
163See In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970), aff’d, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1971), aff’d, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972). 
164Id. at 646 (emphasis added). 
165Shepherd, supra note 5, at 798-99. 
166Id. 
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always involve judgment calls.167  “Many well-meaning people who do not live with 
disabilities will assume that a fetus with disabilities will suffer if brought to term.  
Yet people living with disabilities and persons working and living with disabled 
people often say otherwise.”168  Marsha Saxton, a disability rights activist who 
suffers from spina bifida, states that, “people with disabilities as a group do not 
suffer any more than any other group or category of humans.”169  Every human being 
suffers at some time for some reason.170  There is no way to objectively determine 
whether another person’s suffering is worth living with or if such a person would 
have been better off never being born.  There are many historical examples of people 
who believe that suffering, no matter how severe, is acceptable and sometimes 
honorable when certain principles such as family, country, religion, or culture are at 
stake.171  “Relieving a fetus [who has a genetic disease] of the burden of a life . . . 
might not be as kind-hearted as it initially appears, but rather may show a lack of 
human caring, acceptance, and respect.”172 
In fact, defining the term “disability” remains challenging because of medical 
and technological advances and society’s changing perceptions of “disabled” 
persons.  For example, the American deaf community generally considers deafness 
to be a “culture” rather than a “disability.”173  “Rather than disabled, the deaf are a 
cultural, linguistic minority. . . .  So strong is the feeling of cultural solidarity that 
many deaf parents cheer on discovering that their baby is deaf.”174  The Deaf 
President Now revolution at Gallaudet University has drawn comparisons to the 
Stonewall Riot for gays and lesbians.175  Roslyn Rose, president of the National 
Association of the Deaf, analogizes deafness with race by stating that, “[i]n our 
society everyone agrees that whites have an easier time than blacks.  But do you 
think a black person would undergo operations to become white?”176 
                                                                
167See Weiss, supra note 103, at A1 (quoting LeRoy Walters, the Director of Georgetown 
University’s Kennedy Institute for Ethics, as saying, “There will be clear-cut cases where 
everyone in the world will agree, ‘this is a disease,’ but the concept of health and disease at the 
margin will always involve judgment calls.”). 
168Shepherd, supra note 5, at 782; see also Walsh, supra note 4, at 151-52, 168 (“Are 
programs aimed at the improvement of the overall genetic quality of the population or the 
elimination of genetic disease in complete conflict with the recognition of the rights and value 
of the disabled?  Why do we reject the disabled under the guise of compassion for their 
suffering?”).  
169Marsha Saxton, Prenatal Screening and Discriminatory Attitudes About Disability, 13 
WOMEN  & HEALTH  217, 222 (1988). 
170See Shepherd, supra note 5, at 783-84 (1995). 
171Id. 
172Id. at 782. 
173Id. at 761-62. 
174Id. 
175See Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open Future, 28 
RUTGERS L.J. 549, 570 (1997). 
176Id. at 571.  Another activist rhetorically asked, “When Gorbachev visited the U.S., he 
used an interpreter to talk to the President.  Was Gorbachev disabled?”  Id. at 572. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed these difficulties and decided that 
individuals infected with HIV are “disabled” within the meaning of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”).177  Under Bragdon v. Abbott, asymptomatic 
individuals infected with HIV are disabled under the ADA and thereby protected 
from discrimination based on their disability.178 
Another factor that makes it impossible to determine the genetic defects to which 
a court might order gene therapy is the wide spectrum of individual values and 
disabilities.  Where do we draw the line between gene therapy and eugenics?  In 
1994, China passed legislation that required abortions of fetuses that carried 
hereditary diseases or were otherwise abnormal.179  If gene therapy is permissible to 
relieve suffering, what level or threshold of suffering must be met?180  “What 
about . . . Down’s syndrome, emotional instability, lack of artistic skill, athletic 
incompetence, shortness, or freckles? . . .  If diabetes, sickle-cell anemia, and cancer 
are to be cured by altering the genetic makeup of an individual, why not proceed to 
other ‘disorders’: myopia, color blindness, left-handedness.”181  This problem 
becomes even more complex when genetic predispositions to disease are considered.  
The concepts of “health” and “normality 
” would become narrow, socially-determined standards.182 
Furthermore, studies suggest that society will desire to alter or correct genes for 
reasons other than preventing disabilities or diseases, based on the wide range of 
attitudes regarding disabilities and diseases.  One study evaluated the attitudes of 
parents of children with cystic fibrosis and found that the percentage of women who 
would abort fetuses with genetic disorders varied depending on the disorder.183  
Fifty-eight percent would abort a severely mentally retarded fetus during the first 
trimester.184  Twenty percent would abort a fetus with cystic fibrosis and 17% would 
abort if the fetus would develop a painful and incurable disorder by age forty.185  
These attitudes toward abortion from those familiar with genetic diseases supports 
the inference that most women would choose to undergo gene therapy for serious 
diseases or disorders.  An alarming outcome of that study was that 12% of those 
surveyed would abort a fetus that was predisposed to suffer from severe and 
                                                                
177See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (1998). 
178However, “[e]very agency to consider the issue under [§ 504 of] the Rehabilitation Act 
[which prohibits discrimination based on disability] found statutory coverage for persons with 
asymptomatic HIV.”  Id. at 2207. 
179See Shepherd, supra note 5, at 779 n.94.  The law, titled the ‘Maternal and Infantile 
Health Care Law,’ was, in draft form, titled, ‘Eugenics and Health Protection,’ but was 
renamed following criticism from the West.  Id.  
180See Harding, supra note 12, at 511-12.  
181Id. 
182See Munayyer, supra note 10, at 698-99. 
183See Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Attitudes Toward Abortion Among Parents of Children 
with Cystic Fibrosis, 81 AM. J. PUBLIC  HEALTH 992, 992 (1991).  Severe mental retardation 
was the most crucial factor in deciding to abort.  Id. 
184Id. 
185Id. 
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untreatable obesity.186  Similarly, 3% would abort a fetus with a treatable physical 
defect such as cleft palate or nearsightedness, 2% would abort a fetus that was 
predisposed to alcoholism, and 0.4% would abort a fetus that was not the sex desired 
by the parents.187  This study illustrates the extreme difficulties that face courts, 
legislatures, and society as a whole when deciding what “illnesses” must be “fixed” 
by gene therapy in utero. 
Another study found that the percentage of women who would terminate their 
pregnancy varied based on the probability of the fetus being affected.188  There was a 
“sharp increase in the number of women saying that they would have an abortion 
when the probability of the fetus being affected rose from 95 to 100 percent.”189  
However, thirty-nine women [out of almost five hundred surveyed] said they would 
not abort even if there was a 100% chance that the fetus had a neural tube defect.”190  
Another study shows that most Americans will take advantage of gene therapy 
when it becomes safe, effective, and somewhat routine.191  However, those surveyed 
would use gene therapy for reasons other than prevention of disability or disease.192  
Forty-three percent approved the use of gene therapy to improve their childrens’ 
physical characteristics and 42% approved the use of gene therapy to improve their 
childrens’ intelligence level.193 
It is impossible to objectively determine whether another person’s fetus should be 
aborted or genetically altered.  Attitudes toward suffering and disability are so 
subjective that gene therapy for one woman’s fetus may be a good idea while gene 
therapy for another woman’s fetus with the same “disability” may not be.  Courts 
should refrain from imposing their own notions of when life is or is not worth living 
or imposing gene therapy to alter another person’s quality of life. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Some predict that gene therapy issues will eventually swallow the abortion 
issue.194  “With every step toward perfecting the control of genetics and procreation, 
abortion becomes a mere relic — a crude, draconian attempt from a bygone age to 
affect propagation.”195  Regardless of whether this prediction has merit, issues 
surrounding gene therapy will certainly continue to be debated.  Societal and 
individual conceptions of morality, suffering, health, and desirability of certain traits 
                                                                
186Id. at 994 fig. 2. 
187Id. 
188See Ruth R. Faden et al., Prenatal Screening and Pregnant Women’s Attitudes Toward 
the Abortion of Defective Fetuses, 77 AM. J. PUBLIC  HEALTH 288, 289 (1987). 
189Id. at 290. 
190Id. at 289. 
191See Andrews, supra note 2, at 900 (citing Results of Public Survey on Human Genetics 
Released, Cancer Weekly, Dec. 21, 1992, at 9).  
192Id. 
193Id. 
194See Harding, supra note 12, at 472. 
195Id. 
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss1/6
1999] GENE THERAPY 85 
blur the line between gene therapy for the prevention of disease and gene therapy for 
purely eugenic purposes.  If courts order pregnant women to undergo gene therapy in 
utero despite the undue burden on women and the lack of a rescue doctrine for those 
already living, “the social focus, whether scientifically realistic or not, shifts from 
encouraging tolerance of human diversity to developing methods to avoid it.”196  
Discrimination would expand from race, gender, and socio-economic status to 
include those who are genetically “inferior.”  The decision to undergo gene therapy 
in utero should be the private decision solely for a pregnant woman. 
[I]n a more ideal world where economic differences, if they exist, do not 
affect decisions of medical care or childbearing, where carrier screening 
and prenatal screening can accurately predict to the one-thousandth 
percent the likelihood and severity of expression of genetic traits, where 
prenatal screening and fetal therapies are, with perfect accuracy, 
medically recommended and performed without risk to mother or fetus, 
where in vitro fertilization to allow perfect gene replacement of the 
deleterious gene is widely available, safe, and effective, still, in that 
world, I maintain, a woman should be allowed to have a child with genetic 
differences. . . .  If two deaf adults, or two adult dwarfs, wish to have a 
child and are comfortable with the possibility that they may pass on genes 
for deafness or dwarfism to their offspring . . . we [should] respect the 
prospective parents’ decision to ‘let nature take its course.’197 
                                                                
196See Munayyer, supra note 10, at 699. 
197Shepherd, supra note 5, at 796, 798-99. 
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